INTRODUCTION
Suppose that a retail worker making slightly above minimum wage is asked by her supervisor to come in early but not clock in until her shift is scheduled to begin. She is also asked to stay late, even though her babysitter is expecting her home, and to finish putting the clothes from the dressing rooms back on the racks before she leaves, but only after she clocks out. Imagine also that her manager tells her that yes, she can take her mandated lunch hour, but it would be better for her if she were to check and clean the bathrooms before she sat down to eat. Also, if she wants to keep her job, the forty-five hours she worked will be reflected on her time card as forty so that the store will not have to pay her premium overtime pay for those five extra hours, and thus keep within the company's strict payroll budget. She's told that the store will make it up to her next quarter, but it never does. Will she be able to find a private attorney to help her recover the dollars she has coming to her? Are her federal or state Departments of Labor likely to investigate her complaint, even if she was knowledgeable enough to make such a claim?
Off-the-clock work, meal and overtime violations, and time shaving are all part of a pervasive wage theft problem facing American workers. Unscrupulous employers seek to survive and thrive in business by keeping payroll costs low through these and other unlawful wage practices. The law in this area is broad and clear: the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 requires that all workers (save the few covered by a small number of specific enumerated exceptions) must be paid minimum wage and overtime pay for all hours worked for the benefit of their employers.
1 Moreover, various state wage and hour laws provide further redress against off-the-clock work such as that described above. However, public enforcement of these legal mandates has been lacking for years, and private enforcement has come under recent attack by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Because of high transaction costs and relatively low potential damages, the worker in the above example is likely to recover her lost wages only if she bands together with similarly-situated workers in an aggregate lawsuit against her employer. However, this type of collective action is under attack: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion is the latest Supreme Court case to examine the viability of mandatory arbitration clauses that prohibit class actions, and in a sharply divided opinion, it determined that mandating individual arbitration is consistent with federal labor policy. 2 This Article brings new insights into the Supreme Court's widening blind spot regarding the impact procedural rules have on the substantive rights of low-wage workers. Moreover, it touches upon a greater trend in American jurisprudence of courts "closing the courtroom doors" 3 on plaintiffs, especially those unlikely to afford legal representation. By drawing attention to the unjust effects of facially neutral rules on poor workers, this Article contributes to the national conversation on how Supreme Court precedent limiting judicial access affects the most vulnerable in our society.
Much scholarly attention has been given to the debate on the appropriateness of mandating arbitration, especially amongst employers and employees, with its attendant bargaining and power inequities. 4 However, the literature thus far has failed to capture the rest of the story: it's not just about the forced nature of arbitration but also about whether the forum can fit the needs of vulnerable and poor parties. Moreover, the focus on employment arbitration is mostly centered on employment discrimination and the difficulties of arbitration as a forum for complex burden-shifting liability. But wage claims are significantly different and bring a different set of considerations that must be addressed when evaluating the benefits and burdens of the arbitration forum.
At first blush, merely changing the forum from public litigation to private arbitration would seem not to affect the ability of low-wage workers to vindicate their statutory wage rights. But, as this Article explains, several factors effectively incentivize unscrupulous employers to profit off the backs of low-wage workers: unfettered arbitration mandates, prohibitions-on aggregating claims, anemic regulation and public enforcement of wages, and high transactional costs. These factors combine to close the doors of justice on low-wage workers.
In Part I, wage theft as a persistent national epidemic is discussed, including the most recent studies on low-wage work and the trend in litigating statutory wage rights. Also, this section looks at the under-enforcement of our country's wage protections and employer incentives for violating the FLSA.
In Part II, this Article examines the role class actions play in vindicating wage rights for low-wage workers. Because of the high transaction costs and relatively low individual damages at stake, aggregation of claims is often the only vehicle by which to vindicate statutory wage rights. Collective actions also have the advantage of protecting vulnerable workers from drawing attention to their individual participation and subjecting them to retaliatory measures. Additionally, collective actions increase awareness of workplace violations and increase the cost of non-compliance, which benefits both workers and responsible employers who would otherwise be at a disadvantage in their competition with wage violators.
Part III explores the doctrine of mandatory arbitration and class waivers, including the most recent trends in the arbitrability of federal wage and hour laws. Judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements has widened considerably over the last several decades, culminating in a recent Supreme Court decision, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 5 which muddied the already unclear waters of class arbitration. This section looks carefully at the Concepcion decision and its progeny to help foresee the future of wage collective actions.
Part IV summarizes the "search for the silver lining," asking where low-wage workers should go from here and proposing four plans for combating wage theft. The first two paths involve redress for wage theft within the current enforcement and regulatory system with strategies addressing the current judicial climate. The second two proposals involve changing the arbitral forum to fit the need of low-wage workers, including a broader role for worker centers and unions, changing unauthorized practice of law rules, and developing specialized courts to address wage theft.
I. WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA
"Wage theft" has become the twenty-first century moniker for a variety of wage and hour violations faced by low-wage workers in today's workplace.6 Unpaid minimum wages, misclassification of workers as "salaried" and therefore ineligible for overtime, "off-the-clock" work (such as pre-and post-shift unpaid work and work through mandatory unpaid breaks), illegal deductions, failure to pay final paychecks-these unlawful practices result in millions of dollars of lost money for workers who can least afford it. 7 As witnessed by Dr. Nancy Reichman, a sociologist in the field, the number of scholarly articles and media reports studying the term "wage theft" first appeared in 2005 and has grown steadily since then. 8 The rising number of lawsuits against major corporate employers is another indication that wage and hour violations portend a "crisis" for American workers. 9 Claims by workers that their employers fail to pay them correctly have quadrupled over the last decade, increasing by 73% from 2006 to 2007 alone.
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For over seven decades, the federal standard for unpaid wage claims has been the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).
11 Following hearings in the 1930s, Congress found that the unregulated and substandard work conditions prevalent in Depression-era America negatively affected the "health, efficiency and general well-being" of workers, and enacted the FLSA. 12 The FLSA establishes: (1) a minimum wage; 13 (2) a requirement of premium overtime pay for work exceeding forty hours in a workweek;
14 (3) a prohibition on child labor; 15 and (4) a mandate that employers keep accurate time records. 16 Notably, seventy-four years post-enactment, the FLSA remains the primary wage protection law of our country. 17 The fact that wage theft claims under the FLSA have seen such resurgence in the last decade suggests that protecting the well-being of low-wage workers remains a daunting challenge.
A. Low-Wage Work: Impacting the Most Vulnerable One-quarter of all U.S. adults can be characterized as "low-wage workers," meaning they earn on average $27,000 per year while working at ica's most celebrated chefs, owned (with others) three restaurants that stood accused of misappropriating the tips of servers and bartenders and failing to pay overtime. 31 The FLSA collective action settled for $800,000 after sixtyfive servers opted in to the lawsuit. 32 In Los Angeles, the city attorney filed criminal charges against owners of four car washes, charging them with failure to pay the minimum wage and failure to provide the workers lawful breaks. 33 In the subsequent lawsuit, workers claimed they were paid a flat rate of $35 to $40 dollars a day for shifts that lasted more than eight hours, and were given only fifteen minutes a day for lunch, while some workers alleged they worked for tips alone. 34 These cases highlight some examples of wage and hour abuses that see the light of a courthouse, and with successful lawyering, compensate workers (though sometimes only partially) for lost wages.
But an increasing number of studies have shown that many low-wage workers continue to be subject to wage theft and often lack legal access to have their claims heard. The most comprehensive study of wage theft was published in 2009. 35 A collaboration of non-profits and research centers conducted a survey of 4,387 workers in low-wage industries in the three largest U.S. cities: Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. 36 These "frontline" workers 37 were employed by both large and small employers in a variety of industries, such as retail stores, residential construction, and home health care. 38 The survey asked specific questions about their work and compensation in the previous work week. 39 Twenty-six percent of surveyed workers reported being paid less than minimum wage, with more than half underpaid by more than a dollar an hour. 4° For the low-wage workers that worked over forty hours in a week, 76% faced unpaid or underpaid overtime.41 These (and other) violations resulted in a wage theft of 15% of earnings for the surveyed workers, and, if extrapolated to the nearly 1.12 million low-wage workers in the three cities, would result in low-wage workers losing more than $56 million dollars per week. 42 31 Smaller, more localized studies support the conclusion that low-wage workers suffer wage theft at an alarming rate. In New York City, 30% of 436 retail workers interviewed reported that they worked over forty hours without being paid overtime, while 73% were not paid the four-hour minimum reporting pay when called in to work, as required by state law. 43 In San Francisco, a survey of Chinatown workers reported that 50% of workers earned less than minimum wage, with 13% earning $5.00 an hour or less. 44 In Denver, Colorado, 40% of domestic workers surveyed earned less than minimum wage; 45% reported they were not paid for all hours worked; and 90% stated they worked sixty hours or more in a week yet failed to receive overtime pay. 45 Reported litigation, combined with recent surveys, shows that wage theft is not uncommon or relegated to a few vulnerable industries by a handful of "rogue" employers.
46 Instead, its widespread effects harm not only the poorest of our society, but also disadvantage responsible employers who are forced to compete with unscrupulous competitors in a tight labor market and s.lQ..w economy. Some commentators blame the incentives to violate the FLSA for deepening the wage theft problem. 47 When employers balance "'the expected costs of the mandated wage ... against the expected cost of non-compliance, "' 48 given that the FLSA only allows for liquidated (double) damages with no punitive damage allowance, the calculus informs employers to keep their money in the bank and wait for enforcement, either private or public. Usually the wait is quite lengthy, if it comes at all, as the next section details. in thirty years. 56 While at first blush, a decline in complaints to the DOL might be interpreted to mean a decreasing wage theft problem, this interpretation is at odds with recent studies of wage theft amongst the working poor and the concurrent increase in FLSA litigation filings. Instead, it reflects a deliberate choice of employees to vindicate wage rights through litigation and not government enforcement, a decision supported by the lack of enforcement resources.
The picture is grim for low-wage workers who wish to make a complaint to the DOL. In a report released in March 2009, the Government Accountability Office found that the WHD mishandled nine of the ten cases brought by a team of undercover agents posing as aggrieved workers. 57 The report gives a stark example: a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) undercover agent posing as a dishwasher called four times to complain about not being paid overtime for nineteen weeks; the DOL's Miami office failed to return his calls for four months, and when it did, an official told him it would take eight to ten months to begin investigating his case. 58 Additionally, the DOL diminishes the deterrent effect it might have on dishonest employers when it publicizes the fact that it rarely seeks the full extent of damages afforded by the law and largely pursues individual monetary awards instead of seeking collective awards or industry-wide injunctive relief. 5 9 The investigators at the WHD are instructed not to include the liquidated damages amount in their negotiations with employers and to seek just two years of backpay, instead of the statutorily-allowed three, for willful violations. hires, 61 the DOL implemented a new "regulatory philosophy" of requiring employers to audit themselves to ensure they are complying with the law/ 2 and the 2011 budget included $25 million for the DOL to address the misclassification of employees, $12 million of which was designated for enforcement of wage and overtime laws. 63 Whether these measures can reverse a three-decade long decline in DOL enforcement remains to be seen.
Additionally, state wage and hour agencies are tasked with the enforcement of state wage and hour laws. States' efforts to enforce wage and hours laws vary greatly. 64 One recent study found that "[t]he resources that states devoted to enforcing their laws, the procedures they used, and the volume of their enforcement activity were strikingly different" and the "volume of enforcement activity ranged from 303 cases per thousand lowwage workers to four cases, and the wages collected per case ranged from $36,294 to $128." 65 Local studies of state agency enforcement support the conclusion that under-enforcement of state wage and hour laws remains common. Just over a decade ago, the New York State Department of Labor was challenged as systemically under-enforcing its wage and hour laws, as well as being unresponsive to immigrant workers' complaints. 66 A 2002 study of California's Division of Labor Standards Enforcement found that its budget and staffing allocations have not kept up with growth of the state's workforce, and its investigations and penalties assessed have not increased in proportion to additional funding and staffing. 67 The other avenue for workers to vindicate their statutory wage rights is to bring a private action in civil court without reporting the violation to the DOL. 68 Of course, when an employee brings a civil claim to federal or state court, she is responsible for the costs of litigation, and in some juris- plaintiff must first bring a charge of discrimination to the regulatory agency of the EEOC, a wage claim can be brought directly to court without first complaining to the regulatory agency.
dictions, liable for attorneys' fees if she is not successful in the lawsuit.
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For low-wage workers this is a significant barrier to accessing the law.
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While free legal service organizations take some wage and hour cases, given how few there are and their small budgets/ 1 it remains a small drop in the bucket for addressing wage theft. Moreover, federally funded Legal Services Corporation offices are prohibited from representing undocumented workers, a significant number of the low-wage workers in America.
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Given the financial barriers to bringing individual private causes of action, aggregating low-wage workers' claims has been the primary source of private enforcement of wage theft.
II. THE ROLE OF CLASS ACTIONS IN PROTECTING AGAINST WAGE THEFT
For low-wage workers who are unable to attain attorney representation for their individual wage theft claims, aggregating claims with other workers is often the only way to have their claims addressed. By combining their relatively small damage award with multiple similarly-situated workers, class action attorneys have an incentive to become "private attorney[s] general" in FLSA practice. 78. Rule 23(a) requires that: (I) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(a). Additionally, a class also must qualify as one of the three Rule 23(b) types defined mainly by the relief sought. The least common, (b)(1), applies when separate actions risk multiple court orders inconsistent with each other or the rights of non-parties;
In contrast, aggregate FLSA claims are governed by statutory rule: Section 216(b). 80 Pursuant to statute, these are "opt-in" actions, requiring each putative plaintiff to opt in to the suit by filing a consent-to-join form with the court in order to participate in the action.
81 A brief historical overview is helpful to understand its importance and how this distinction evolved.
Enacted as part of the FLSA, and applicable to later employment laws codified in the same statutory chapter, Section 216(b) provides that "[a]n action ... may be maintained ... by any one or more employees for ... other employees similarly situated."
82 Under the original statutory language, "collective action[ s ]" let employees designate third parties, mainly labor unions, to file their wage suits, but soon this practice drew heavy criticism. 83 To eliminate third-party suits, in 194 7 Congress amended Section 216(b) to require workers themselves be the plaintiffs 84 and that other workers must affirmatively "opt in" by filing a written consent, 85 which reflected the prevailing class mechanism of the time. 86 This amendment carne before modem Rule 23 opt-out classes were implemented to assist civil rights causes of action in the 1960s, and soon thereafter became the norm. 87 The sole reSection (b)(2) applies when members seek mainly injunctive or declaratory relief against a party who acted on "grounds that apply generally to the class," as in lawsuits against segregation or pollution, while (b)(3) applies to money damages claims, making it most similar to § 216(b) wage collective actions. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b). A (b)(3) class requires that common issues "predominate" over individual ones and that a class action be "superior to other" options, such as many individual suits. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also quirement of Section 216(b) is that members must be "similarly situated" and opt into the action individually.
The procedural oddity that is Section 216(b ), combined with the value of most individual wage theft claims, sets the stage for an increased role that aggregate litigation plays for low-wage workers.
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A. The Difficulties in Prosecuting Small Wage Claims
The courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, routinely recognize the importance of aggregate litigation because it often remains the only means of judicial relief where a plaintiffs claim is too small economically to support individual litigation. 89 Where the value of the claim is less than the transaction costs, such "negative-value" claims typically are heard only if brought in the aggregate.
90 Most claims of low-wage workers involve relatively small per-person damages, 91 and although these lost wages are crucial 89. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (noting that the policy at the very core of the class action mechanism '"is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights'" (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) ("Class actions ... permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually."); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank of Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (I 980) ("Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device."). to the workers themselves, they fail to capture the attention of a plaintiff's attorney who, although entitled to statutory fees under the FLSA, 92 can only justify the resources it takes to successfully prosecute wage claims if they involve multiple plaintiffs. 93 Additionally, individual litigation requires one plaintiff to shoulder the demands of the lawsuit, including spending many hours assisting in the investigation of the claims and bearing the costs (both financial and personal) of the litigation. Most low-wage workers working on an hourly basis simply cannot afford the time and expense it would take to prosecute the claims individually, nor can they proceed on their own, even if they could navigate the DOL regulatory complaint process or litigate the claims successfully in court pro se. When proceeding as a collective action, the extent to which any one worker bears the burden of prosecuting the litigation is limited.
B. The Threat ofRetaliation
Across industries and where unemployment rates are high, the threat of reprisal for bringing a legal claim against one's employer prevents many workers from pursuing litigation. 94 Current employees fear termination, retaliation in the form of change in schedule or job duties, harassment, or '"the class suit ... provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation'" (quoting Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 23, 27 (Cal. 1981))); Ruckelshaus, supra note 74, at 386 (discussing factors, including the typically small size of each individual worker's claim, that contribute to workers' lack of access to the courts); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 57, at 9 ("Low wage workers may be unable to afford attorney's fees or may be unwilling to argue their own case in small claims court, leaving them with no other options to obtain their back wages."). reduction in pay. 95 As the authors of the most comprehensive wage theft study found, 43% of the low-wage workers surveyed who complained about violations of workplace standards were retaliated against, including being fired, suspended, or threatened with reductions in hours or pay. 96 For former workers who fear difficulties in finding new employment opportunities, being part of a federal litigation is too threatening to contemplate. Workers fear industry "blacklisting" and lack of positive job references, a necessary ingredient for successful job hunts. 97
The Supreme Court has recognized the imbalance of power that engenders such fear in workers. As Justice Marshall acknowledged in a Supreme Court decision of 1978, employers, "by virtue of the employment relationship, may exercise intense leverage. Not only can the employer fire the employee, but job assignments can be switched, hours can be adjusted, wage and salary increases held up, and other more subtle forms of influence exerted." 98
For low-wage workers, these concerns are especially poignant given their precarious job security. Low-wage workers are particularly vulnerable to retaliation because many live "paycheck to paycheck" in mostly lowskilled jobs, where employers consider them replaceable and therefore expendable.99 Low-wage workers are therefore loath to challenge unlawful wage practices, especially when unemployment rates are high. For immigrant workers with limited English proficiency and little familiarity with their legal rights, challenging wage theft is nearly impossible. 99. See BOBO, supra note 6, at 7-15; BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 9 ("Although women, immigrants, and people of color are disproportionately affected by workplace violations, we found that where a worker is employed-that is, in which industry and in what type of job--is generally a much better predictor of violations than the worker's demographic characteristics.").
100. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 5 (citing increased proficiency in English as one way to combat wage theft); id. at 42 (noting the increased likelihood of a wage violation for workers with limited English proficiency). See generally GARCIA, supra note
21.
However, collective actions under the FLSA protect workers from retaliation to a lesser extent than Rule 23 class actions. Rule 23(d) provides a mechanism for judges to enter orders protecting the class, such as authorizing certain discovery and banning harassing litigation tactics.
10 ' Additionally, class actions under Rule 23 help alleviate plaintiffs' fear of retaliation because they allow all but a few named plaintiffs to pursue their rights without having to opt in to the suit. They are "nameless" and "faceless" in the litigation until liability is found and damages are assessed.
102 In contrast, for FLSA collective actions, each worker must affirmatively opt in to the suit, which puts their name before both the court and the employer's attorneys in the early stages of the litigation. 103 Although no study yet has determined that FLSA plaintiffs face a greater rate of retaliation than Rule 23 plaintiffs, the perception of workers is that they are more exposed by affirmatively opting in, and that perception works to dissuade workers from participating.
C. The Importance ofNotification Under 216(b)
Today, many workers, especially low-wage workers, are unaware that their statutory wage rights have been violated until they are specifically informed of the violation. Unlike the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, where the societal ideal of anti-discrimination was discussed openly and publicly, wage protection laws enjoyed their heyday (if at all) close to eighty years ago, when the New Deal legislation addressed the abysmal conditions of the working poor.
104 Some employers misinform (either intentionally or unintentionally) their employees that the law does not protect them or that they are exempt from minimum wage or overtime laws. 1984) (noting that plaintiffs alleged affirmative misrepresentations by employer which were sufficient to toll the statute of limitations applicable to their claims); Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 567 ("The likelihood of employee unawareness is even greater when, as alleged in the present ease, the employer does not simply fail to pay overtime but affirmatively tells its employees that they are not eligible for overtime.").
immigrants, Hoffman Plastics Compounds (which limited backpay remedies to undocumented workers in a NLRA suit) likely has contributed to the confusion on whether they can prosecute their wage rights in a court of law.
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Courts have reasoned that notice to affected workers who must affirmatively opt in to the suit before the statute of limitations runs out 107 is a necessary component of collective action procedure.
108 Early in the litigation, notice of collective action pursuant to Section 216(b) provides workers not only information regarding their wage rights, but an entry point into the legal system by directing them to the plaintiffs' attorneys for counsel. By letting workers know of an ongoing litigation, they can gain some measure of security and comfort knowing that they are not alone in challenging the policies and practices of their employers.
D. Deterring Future Wage Theft
Through aggregating claims, workers benefit from the increased pressure employers feel when faced with collective litigation and the opportunities for making positive, systemic changes in the workplace through classwide discovery and injunctive relief.
Collective actions provide a strong counterbalance to employers' incentive to violate the FLSA. The sheer magnitude and scope of class litigation enhances the likelihood that a targeted employer will comply with the law. In fact, plaintiffs' attorneys note that upon service of a class complaint, workers report that the employer changes its wage practices to come into compliance with the law. 109 The ability of collective claims to obtain significant damages in back pay and potential attorneys' fees (even absent punitive damages) changes the calculus for employers contemplating compliance or noncompliance. Moreover, collective actions under the FLSA brought by the DOL can include injunctive relief as a remedy.
110 Injunctive relief-mandating changes in corporate policies and practices--can have a tremendous impact on low-wage workers, especially when involving large employers.'" While some scholars have criticized employment discrimination class actions as having little to no effect on actual positive change in the workplace because of the lack of meaningful injunctive relief, 112 such criticism has not yet targeted FLSA collective actions, perhaps because DOL actions are relatively rare, or perhaps because wage violations (denying overtime, classifying too many as "exempt," etc.) are easier to stop than more decentralized, more subjective hiring decisions that may be based on subconscious or at least hidden discriminatory intent.
Lastly, when alleging wage and hour violations, the same corporate policies, patterns, and practices usually affect multiple workers in a workplace, not just individuals. When litigating an individual suit, it can be difficult to identify and prove systemic violations, in part because companywide discovery is not allowed or affordable.
113 In contrast, collective actions demand that plaintiffs prove that employees are "similarly situated," which opens the door to the discovery of class-wide statistics and evidence.
However, while these pressures legitimately promote compliance with wage laws by unscrupulous employers, the same procedures are said to ap- ( reporting that a survey of federal cases in 2008 showed "median litigation costs, including attorneys' fees, of $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants" "[i]n cases in which one or more types of discovery was reported"). Vol. 2012:1103 ply unfair pressure on employers who sought to pay their workers lawfully but are faced with collective litigation on wage practices that might or might not be considered in violation of the FLSA.
114 These arguments point to the "gun to the head" settlement pressure that class actions have on employers; many commentators have expressed concern over class litigation because of this pressure, and many have called for a congressional response, to which there has been some success.
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These concerns are lessened, but perhaps not wholly alleviated by, the 216(b) procedural mechanism. As opposed to the unnamed plaintiffs of Rule 23 classes, FLSA collective actions are comprised only of workers that affirmatively opt in and report wage violations similar to those the named plaintiffs allege. Because of this procedural quirk, employers are faced with fewer collective plaintiffs and, therefore, lower costs. Also, in contrast to the complex burden shifting standards of Title VII or intricacies of anti-trust law, 116 the liability standard under the FLSA is relatively straightforward, which supports a healthy skepticism of whether employers facing FLSA actions are truly unknowing victims of "gotcha" litigations. 114. Glover, supra note 70, at 1196 ("[U]nder the American rule of litigationwhereby each party bears his own litigation costs-virtually all of the costs in these cases will be borne by defendants, who likely have little to request in the way of discovery from plaintiffs. As a result, discovery alone can generate significant settlement pressure even if the defendants did nothing wrong and are likely to be ultimately exonerated." (footnote omitted)).
115. The Class Action Fairness Act of2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, substantially changed the landscape of class action procedure in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006). Concerned with forum-shopping, unscrupulous class action attorneys, and professional plaintiffs, the Act codified a "consumer class action bill of rights" and expanded federal diversity jurisdiction for class claims. 119 Stat. at 5. However, even within the CAFA debate, Congress recognized the value class actions have for small claims: "Class actions were designed to provide a mechanism by which persons, whose injuries are not large enough to make pursuing their individual claims in the court system cost efficient, are able to bind together with persons suffering the same harm and seek redress for their injuries." S.
REP. No. 109-14, at 4 (2005). Then-President Bush agreed:
Class-actions can serve a valuable purpose in our legal system. They allow numerous victims of the same wrongdoing to merge their claims into a single lawsuit. When used properly, class-actions make the legal system more efficient and help guarantee that injured people receive proper compensation. 
III. THE GROWTH OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND CLASS WAIVERS IN EMPLOYMENT CONTEXTS
As the number of wage and hour suits precipitously rose in the last decade, a parallel trend of arbitration as the "new litigation" 118 gained momentum. The growing number of arbitration clauses in contracts of all sorts-trade, consumer, and most importantly for this Article, employment-resulted in private arbitration becoming a "parallel judicial sys-. tem," 119 one that allows employers with superior bargaining power to define the parameters of the dispute resolution process.
For employees, mandates to arbitrate any and all conflicts resulting from their employment can be found in a variety of places: an offer letter or job application, 120 a slip of paper in the envelope that holds their paycheck, 121 the employer's employment handbook, 122 or a severance agreement. 123 In whichever form they take, arbitration clauses are estimated to cover at least 30 million employees, 124 a number that most commentators agree is sure to continue rising 125 given the broad support they have received LLC v. Concepcion that corporate boilerplate language in AT&T's consumer contract mandating individual dispute resolution (with no opportunity to aggregate claims in class actions, known colloquially as the "class waiver") is enforceable and consistent with federal public policy. 127 The combined effect of mandatory arbitration and class waivers facilitates the silencing of low-wage workers from voicing wage theft claims. Shedding light on how arbitration works reveals its impact in the employment context. disputes. "' 130 As a multitude of courts have since recognized, Congress intended to place arbitration agreements on "equal footing with other contracts" and establish a '"strong federal policy favoring arbitration."' 131 Section 2 of the FAA provides, quite simply, that "[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."132 The broad policy in favor of arbitration is tempered within the language of the FAA itself in § 2, where the "savings clause" allows for any party to oppose arbitration on grounds that "exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 133 Additionally, § 1 offers an express statutory exception for certain employment contracts, namely "seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
134 Section 4 of the FAA provides that "[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement." 135 If a litigant in a court proceeding refuses to arbitrate a dispute within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement, a judicial order compelling arbitration is mandatory, not discretionary .
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The long and somewhat tortured path of the FAA from a policy promoting the efficient settlement of conflicts between merchants pursuant to industry norms to "an invitation to the business community to create a parallel procedural regime" 137 is one that is largely outside the scope of this Article. 138 However, as it relates to the increased relevance to employment relationships and, in particular, low-wage workers, an important starting point is the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 139 In Gilmer, a stockbroker's employer required him to register as a securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange. 140 That application included an arbitration clause to arbitrate any dispute arising out of his employment.141 After the employee was terminated, he sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging that he was fired unlawfully because of his age. 142 The Supreme Court held that employers could require employees to agree, as a condition of employment, to arbitrate federal statutory age discrimination cases, with reasoning that spawned later case law holding that predispute arbitration clauses covering virtually any federal and state statutory claim were also enforceable. 143 The Supreme Court stated clearly that "' [b ]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. "' 144
The Gilmer decision came as a surprise to some scholars 145 and employee advocates given that a previous Supreme Court precedent seemingly squarely on point held that an employee could proceed to court on a statutory rights claim (Title VII) despite an arbitration agreement between the employer and the union. 146 Nonetheless, Gilmer ushered in a sea change in the doctrine of arbitration enforcement: from that point forward, employment contracts were seen as fitting squarely within the arbitration mandate. Yet, subsequent Supreme Court precedent in this area, including Green Tree v. Randolph, did cite the importance of plaintiffs' ability to vindicate their statutory rights: arbitration of statutory rights will only be compelled "'so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [ ry cause of action in the arbitral forum, "' 147 even in cases that ultimately upheld the arbitration conditions.
B. Class Waivers: Banning Aggregate Claims
Following the judicial approval of arbitration mandates in employment contracts, employers began more vigorously to import language into those clauses from commercial and consumer contracts to prevent parties from joining together in class and collective actions.
148 Further, employers began challenging class arbitrations in agreements that were silent as to class treatment in the hope of forcing arbitration of individual claims without aggregate treatment. 
When Silence in Contracts Is Given Legal Meaning
When faced with an arbitration clause silent on class treatment, the Supreme Court first held that "ambiguity" exists as to the intentions of the parties and the arbitrator must decide whether the agreement was intended to prohibit class-wide arbitration.
150 The plurality decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle left many court watchers confused as to the state of the law of class waivers, but did at least confirm that courts foresee arbitrators as able to conduct class actions and that the FAA does not preclude class-wide relief, 151 rejecting a posture taken by businesses.
152
In response, the plaintiffs' bar renewed its attack on class arbitration waivers as unconscionable under state contract principles.
153 Advocates argued that the inclusion of class waivers in standard adhesion contracts violated the common law contract doctrine prohibiting "unconscionable" or unfair agreements because they are so one-sided. 154 A majority of courts examining the issue initially rejected this theory, holding that the contractual waiver of the "right" to bring a class action did not impact substantive rights and, therefore, was not unfair. 155 However, in 2005, the California Supreme Court seemingly turned the tide when it held in Discover Bank v. Superior Court that because class waivers eliminate any incentive for plaintiffs to prosecute negative value claims, these waivers improperly limit defendants' exposure to damages when they appear in consumer contracts and are applied to allegations comprised of many small monetary claims.
156 State courts around the country followed suit, many finding that class waivers were voidable when the cost of litigation dwarfed an individual plaintiffs potential recovery.
157
The Supreme Court attempted to provide clarity to the class waiver doctrine in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Anima/Feeds International Corp. 158 There, petitioners were shipping companies sued by charterers for price fixing.
159
The maritime contract contained an arbitration mandate but was silent as to class treatment. The parties stipulated that an arbitration panel would decide whether the contract permitted class arbitration. 160 The arbitration panel determined that the expert testimony presented did not demonstrate an "inten[t] to preclude class arbitration," and, therefore, concluded that Bazzle and policy considerations meant that the clause should be read to permit class arbitration. 161 The Supreme Court found that the arbitration panel "imposed its own policy choice" rather than "identifying and applying a rule of decision derived from the FAA or either maritime or New York law" and, therefore, it "exceeded its powers." 162 The Court did not shy away from taking on the issue itself, found the FAA controlling, and held that "a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so." 163 Accordingly, the Court held that because the arbitration panel "imposed class arbitration" without explicit agreement amongst the parties, it reversed the decision of the arbitration panel allowing class arbitration.
164
The takeaway for advocates in the employment sector was that arbitrators must make specific findings on the intent of the parties, but that class arbitration is not precluded when the agreement is silent on class treatment. Arbitrators applying Stolt-Nielsen examined the intent of the parties as controlling, witnessed by the agreement language and relationship of the parties, but understood Stolt-Nielsen to mean that the parties are not required to state an express agreement in order to authorize class arbitration. For example, in Benson v. CSA-Credit Solutions of America, Inc., 165 an FLSA case, an arbitrator made three findings that supported class arbitration after examining the intent of the parties: (1) the arbitration clause contained broad language referring to "any dispute or claim relating to or arising out of the employment relationship;" (2) it specifically excluded disputes pertaining to trade secrets and proprietary information, and the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusion alterius implied that all other claims, including class claims, were included, especially in light of the fact that class waivers in employment were "not uncommon" in 2008, when the arbitration agreement was drafted; and (3) the respondent filed a motion to compel arbitration in civil court only after the claimant filed a collective action, ratifying that such class claims were subject to arbitration. One short year later, the Supreme Court revisited the class waiver issue in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 161 In Concepcion, siblings entered into a cell phone contract and received the advertised "free" cell phones, but, like 54 million other customers, were later charged sales tax on the phone in the amount of $30.22 based on the retail value of the phone. They sued in federal court and their lawsuit was consolidated with a class action alleging false advertising and fraud.
169
AT&T then moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in its standard service agreement, which included a class action waiver.
170 Interestingly, the arbitration clause also lowered the expense of arbitration for complainants: (1) AT&T paid all costs for nonfrivolous claims; (2) the customer chose whether to arbitrate locally in person, over the phone, or by written submission; (3) small claims court was available in lieu of arbitration; (4) arbitrators could award individual relief including injunctions and were not limited to compensatory damages; and (5) AT&T was blocked from an award of attorneys' fees but would have to pay twice the complaint's attorneys' fees plus a minimum recovery of $7,500 if the arbitrator awarded more than AT&T's last settlement offer. 171 The district court followed Discover Bank in finding the class waiver unconscionable under California state law and directed class arbitration. 172 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
173
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in a 5-4 decision written by Justice Scalia, holding that the California Discover Bank rule was preempted by the FAA because it interfered with the federal goal articulated in the FAA of promoting arbitration.
174 With regard to Section 2's saving clause, the Court held that although the "saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives." 175 In so doing, Justice Scalia reasoned that the Discover Bank rule had categorically allowed claimants in any consumer case to demand class arbitration, which he found antithetical to the streamlined dispute resolution process that makes arbitration so favored.
176 Specifically, the Concepcion Court found that "[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation" because: (1) "the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration-its informality;" (2) "it is at the very least odd to think that an arbitrator would be entrusted with en- suring that third parties' due process rights are satisfied;" and (3) "class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants."
177
Moreover, the majority belittled the dissent's concerns about the viability of small value claims as "toothless and malleable."
178 The dissent, written by Justice Breyer, in tum, asked the interesting question: where did the majority get the idea that a fundamental arbitration attribute is individual arbitration?
179
Aside from the questionable applicability of the Court's reasoning to FAA preemption of state law contract doctrine regarding the statutory wage rights of low-wage workers, much of the Court's reasoning is flawed when applied to prohibit aggregation of claims. First, arbitration's perceived informality is illusory for low-wage workers if they are unable to afford the significant costs of private arbitration.
180 As articulated in Part IV of this Article, arbitration might provide a low-cost alternative if arbitration clauses were uniform and regulated to disperse the costs of arbitration. Second, the due process rights of absent class members are, well, absent in the case of FLSA collective actions where each worker must affirmatively opt in to the suit. Under Section 216(b ), each worker is a plaintiff in the case that consents to join the litigation; therefore, due process concerns are negated.
181
Lastly, the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court is concerned about the risks aggregate litigation poses for corporate defendants strikes this author as altogether inappropriate. The reality of the workplace is that workers have no meaningful opportunity to negotiate the terms of these take-it-or-leave-it arbitration and class waiver clauses. Instead, the terms of the "agreement" are presented to the worker as a fait accompli. For low-wage workers fearful of losing their jobs, and faced with a growing wage theft epidemic, the no- tion that the U.S. Supreme Court is mostly concerned with defendants' right to be free from potentially expensive litigation is disappointing. The Concepcion decision has drawn considerable comment from scholars 183 and advocates, as well as other courts. 184 While some business advocates have argued that Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion stand for the proposition that class waivers are per se enforceable, other advocates argue that these cases read together stand for a more narrow point: that parties cannot be forced to arbitrate in class arbitration unless they agree to do so, and a categorical rule that classifies an entire set of cases as unconscionable violates the F AA. The current legal landscape is seemingly split fairly evenly as to how this precedent relates to the small value wage theft claims of low-wage workers. One set of cases relies upon the federal substantive law of arbitrability and determines whether the plaintiffs are able to prove that they will be unable to vindicate their federal statutory rights if precluded from aggregating their claims. 186 Following Concepcion, the Second Circuit in the In re American Express Merchants Litigation line of cases held that class waivers are unenforceable for claimants who are prosecuting federal statutory rights if enforcement of the waiver had the practical effect of prohibiting prosecution of those rights. 187 The court held that the Supreme Court in Concepcion did not address this exact issue: whether a class waiver "is enforceable even if the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of enforcement would be to preclude their ability to vindicate their federal statutory rights."
188 The Second Circuit's focus on substantive statutory protections stems from the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree v. Randolph. The latest 2012 decision notes that the Concepcion decision does not mention Randolph and the federal arbitrability issue remains viable.
189
Two other circuits disagree with the substantive statutory analysis and hold the opposite. The Third 190 and Eighth 191 Circuits have both held class waivers enforceable based on the holding of Concepcion. As the Third Circuit articulated in a FLSA collective action: "We understand the holding of Concepcion to be both broad and clear: a state law that seeks to impose class arbitration despite a contractual agreement for individualized arbitration is inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, the FAA, irrespective of whether class arbitration is desirable for unrelated reasons."
192
A third recent development layers another interesting analysis to the question of class waivers for low-wage workers. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled in January of 2012 that class waivers in arbitration clauses unlawfully restrict workers' right to engage in concerted action for mutual aid or protection pursuant to Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 193 In In re D.R. Horton, a national homebuilding company imposed an arbitration clause on its workers that included a class waiver. 194 The NLRB held that such an agreement violates workers' rights, whether unionized or not, to engage in collective action, protected under Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA, when it requires employees covered by the Act to sign an agreement that precludes them from bringing collective claims. 195 Commentators agree that this decision could have sweeping implications for all workers, "from low-wage restaurant workers to well-paid employees on Wall Street," if allowed to stand. 196 
IV. HOW MANDATORY ARBITRATION WITH CLASS WAIVERS AFFECTS
LOW-WAGE WORKERS: WHERE DO WE Go FROM HERE?
Scholars have noted a disturbing trend in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence: the systematic closing of the courtroom doors, especially for small claim litigants. 197 For low-wage workers, the hurdles placed before class actions by the Wal-Mart v. Dukes 198 and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion199 cases reflect this judicial mindset and, as shown above, severely limit workers' ability to have their wage theft claims heard and addressed.
Of course, employers of low-wage workers could decide that allowing the arbitration costs of a multitude of individual claims is not an economically sound policy, and not altogether feasible, but, thus far, the evidence points in the other direction-towards advising corporate clients to take advantage of the "free pass" Concepcion provides. 200 In the alternative, the Supreme Court could recall the original intent of Congress to allow aggregate litigation for promoting judicial efficiency and self-correct from the current course.
In the meantime, wage theft abuse continues to gain momentum and low-wage workers are left without adequate recourse. What options are left after Concepcion? Four possible avenues of redress remain: two within the current system of enforcement and two new proposals.
A. Redress Within the Current System of Enforcement
Challenging Class Waivers as Precluding Vindication of Federal Statutory Rights
Although at first blush the Concepcion decision seems to provide unqualified support to class waivers in mandatory arbitration contracts, the issue presented was narrowly tailored to federal preemption law, and analyzed a broad, categorical state rule. 201 The decision, therefore, does not speak to the issue of federal arbitrability, which requires judicial consideration of imposing mandatory arbitration without class treatment on claimants who are precluded from vindicating their statutory rights-in this case, its effect on low-wage workers in prosecuting their wage rights. This "substantive rights" federal arbitrability analysis was not before the Court in Concepcion and at least one circuit court post-Concepcion has found that it requires federal courts to declare otherwise operative arbitration clauses unenforceable when enforcement would prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights. 202 Several courts prior to Concepcion found that when plaintiffs are prevented from doing so, the arbitration clause cannot stand or the class waiver is severable from the clause and class arbitration is ordered. 203 A recent decision in the Southern District of New York illustrates how this applies in the FLSA context. In Raniere v. Citigroup, Inc., employees who processed mortgage applications brought an overtime FLSA collective action against Citibank, alleging that they were misclassified as exempt from overtime. 204 Citibank moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the bank's employee handbook, which included a class waiver. 205 The court first held that the right to proceed collectively under FLSA's § 216(b) cannot be waived as a matter of law, citing the legislative history of the Act, as well as Supreme Court FLSA precedent. 206
The named plaintiffs in Raniere were not low-wage workers-their estimated FLSA overtime (though hotly contested) ranged from roughly $30,000 to $150,000 each, not including liquidated damages (which double the amount of overtime due). 207 The court concluded that the plaintiffs were not precluded from arbitrating their claims individually because of the potential costs involved. 208 Nonetheless, the court held the class waiver unenforceable because if any potential class member meets the burden of proving that her costs prevent her from effectively vindicating her rights in arbitration, the clause is unenforceable. 209 "Any other reading would lead district courts down the rabbit hole of piecemeal litigation, confounding the twin advantages of reducing judicial caseload as well as costs to litigants."210 This line of precedent could find traction in the federal courts in FLSA actions and until the Supreme Court visits this issue specifically, could provide a vehicle by which low-wage workers can continue to have their claims aggregated and heard by the courts.
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Additionally, the NLRA provides another opportunity for low-wage workers to argue that they lose another set of important statutory rights: their right to engage in concerted action for mutual aid or protection, as provided for in § 7. As the NLRB found in D.R. Horton, the right to proceed collectively in a wage action is intrinsic to their ability to engage in concerted activity: "Employees who join together to bring employment-related claims on a classwide or collective basis in court or before an arbitrator are exercising rights protected by § 7 of the NLRA," specifically the right "'to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. " ' 212 Accordingly, although applied in a small number of cases thus far, another avenue for low-wage workers is to argue that class waivers prevent them from enforcing their federal substantive statutory rights under the FLSA and NLRA and that federal courts should "harmonize" the FAA and these important employee protection statutes by applying the "vindication of statutory rights analysis of Randolph and related case [s] ." 213 
Renewed Public Enforcement of Wage Rights
The Obama Administration has publicized its commitment to wage and hour enforcement, committing resources for hiring additional DOL WHO investigators, 214 testing the waters for a new "regulatory philosophy" of requiring employers to audit themselves to ensure they are complying with the law, 215 and voicing a renewed commitment to investigate the misclassification of employees and enforcement of wage and overtime laws. 216 Because the latest report analyzing DOL enforcement measures is from 2008, 217 whether these measures are successful in reversing the tide of three decades of languishing wage and hour enforcement is unknown. However, with President Obama winning a second term, the DOL has an improved chance of receiving continued support. Moreover a bill introduced in Congress to address this problem, the Wage Theft Prevention and Community Partnership Act, died in committee.
218
Some states and municipalities have recognized the "scourge" of wage theft 219 and responded with their own wage theft prevention laws. Just in the last five years, five states (California, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, and Washington) and two municipalities (San Francisco and MiamiDade County) have enacted such legislation, and three states (Texas, Illinois, and Maryland) and one city (Seattle) amended existing laws to shore up wage protections. 220 Moreover, criminal penalties for wage theft are an-other regulatory avenue some communities have taken or considered in combating abuse. 221 In order for these ordinances and state laws to be effective, state and local communities have to be committed to enforcing these measures lest they become symbolic only. One team of scholars proposes that state Attorneys General (AGs) begin making use of their ''parens patriae" authority to prosecute wage theft cases on a collective basis.
222 By representing the interests of plaintiffs in wage and hour cases, state AGs can take on the role of "guardians of the public welfare" by collectively litigating against companies that inflict "broadly dispersed harms. " 223 Another avenue for redress of wage theft is for local labor regulatory agencies to set informal hearings designed to address wage claims. One example that can be a model for other states is in California, where workers may file an administrative claim with the Labor Commissioner, who has the authority to conduct an informal hearing (called a "Berman hearing") and award lost wages. 224 Importantly, either party can appeal the decision, but the employer is required to post a bond equal to the award, employees who prevail in the appeal are entitled to attorneys' fees, and the Labor Commissioner is required to represent employees who cannot afford counsel at the trial. 225 Such measures protect low-wage workers in their attempt to recover lost wages but most critically, until recently, the California Supreme Court recognized that wage hearings before the Labor Commission are not subject to arbitration mandates. 226 However, this holding is currently being relitigated post-AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.
227
In any event, although there may be future improvement in public enforcement, this is dependent on public budgets and election results, and is therefore not a reliable or complete solution to the continuing wage theft epidemic.
B. Changing the Forum to Fit the Need
Making Arbitration Work for Low-Wage Workers
Based on the limits of the above two avenues for relief, individual arbitration of wage claims might be the only avenue left for many low-wage workers. And if this is the case, what is the likelihood that wage theft claims can be successfully addressed in this forum?
Scholars are characteristically divided on the value of litigation versus arbitration as a forum for vindicating statutory rights. As Professors Eigen, Estreicher, Shewyn, and others have argued, federal court litigation is slow, expensive, and not particularly well tailored to the vindication of rights of individual workers, while arbitration is a forum that can be molded to fit the needs of low-cost claims. 228 Despite those observations, for low-wage workers, arbitration is not any more welcoming than federal litigation, even with the relaxed evidentiary and procedural rules. Putting aside ability to take off time from hourly or temporary work with little job security, potential language barriers, and other barriers facing low-wage workers, arbitration is a dispute resolution process that has more in common with litigation than with informal resolution of negotiation and mediation: in order to win a claim, a claimant must present evidence and meet the legal burden, must convince the fact-finder of the facts and applicable law, and has little chance of appealing an incorrect verdict. Although cost, effort, and time spent are higher in federal court, it can also be high in arbitration because of the unfettered discretion of the arbitrator (for example, to order discovery, to entertain motions, to require legal briefings, or to hold an arbitration over several nonconsecutive days).
Accordingly, advocates combating wage theft need to make arbitration as accommodating to their claims as possible. First, advocacy for making arbitration clauses fair to workers is one starting point. Ironically, the arbitration clause in Concepcion can be a model. If used in the employment context, it would provide for: ( 1) the employer to pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims; (2) the claimant to choose whether to arbitrate locally in person, over the phone, or by written submission; (3) small claims court to be made available in lieu of arbitration; (4) arbitrators to award individual relief, including injunctions, not limited to compensatory damages; and (5) the employer being blocked from an award of attorneys' fees but having to pay twice the complainant's attorneys' fees plus a minimum recovery of is in taking a '"holistic approach[] to problem solving and dispute resolution,"' and "'allow[ing] maximum access to the courts by individuals unable to afford an attorney' by simplifying [the] rules of evidence and civil procedure."246 Many small claims courts have extremely low dollar limits, such as $1,000. 247 Judicial reform activists have called for a reform of the small court system to address some of its shortcomings, including: (1) "[ r ]aising small claims dollar limits to $20,000;" (2) "[a]uthorizing small claims judges to issue court orders," including injunctive relief, not just monetary damages; (3) "[e]xpanding small claims dispute resolution programs," such as mediation; (4) "protecting non-lawyer litigants;" and (5) "creating user-friendly courts," such as by expanding hours, adding advising programs, and increasing staff resources. 248 Such initiatives would go a long way in making this forum a viable option for low-wage workers.
As currently structured, do low-wage workers' wage claims fit within most small claims courts across the country? Yes, if jurisdictional limits were increased specifically to reflect potential recovery of wage claims. But the difficulties inherent in navigating the differences in each jurisdiction of each court, including in jurisdictions with inadequate wage and hour state law protections, might mean that the current structure is a poor fit for the task. Another option might be a federal small court system, which some commentators have been calling for in order to gain relief from the expense and time associated with typical federallitigation. 249 If dreaming of a federal small court system, one might as well dream big and consider the opportunity for a small court system tailored to wage claims. As a starting point, consider the family court movement. Recognizing a need for specialized courts to deal with the myriad issues facing families, in 1959, three working groups collaborated to produce the Standard Family Court Act, designed to assist states interested in creating family courts.
25° Family courts grew out of the need to address the disproportionate effects of socioeconomic status and race in family law adjudication:
'"[C]ases involving families from the higher social strata rarely come to trial because the family has financial resources. "' 251 Then, still recognizing the unmet needs of families, the ABA stepped in and recommended the establishment of unified family courts in all jurisdictions. "Through a two-year project funded in late 1996 entitled 'Communities, Families, and the Justice System,"' the ABA helped establish unified family courts system in six cities. 252 The bar recognized that having easier access to judicial relief, a judiciary trained and attuned to the specialized population's needs, and lower costs are essential in addressing that need.
A wage and hour court system-recognizing the unmet needs of America's poor working families-might be exactly what is required to address our wage theft epidemic. Given the parallel need for low-wage workers to vindicate their claims in court, a movement-a workers' wage rights movement-to address wage theft's pressing legal claims might find momentum if spearheaded by a collaboration of worker organizations, unions, practitioners, and scholars.
CONCLUSION
For low-wage workers who suffer wage theft, the dollars missing from their paychecks violate existing law and significantly impact the well-being of individuals, families, and communities. While this dire societal problem continues unabated, the Supreme Court continues "closing the courtroom doors" by allowing employers to force workers both out of court and into private arbitration, while simultaneously prohibiting aggregate claims. Such tactics work in confluence to silence wage claims, leaving far too many claims unheard while unscrupulous employers gain direct advantage.
This Article explains how the intersection of various procedural rulings has combined to prevent meaningful redress for wage theft and also proposes potential improvements. The courts might take corrective action by recognizing that the substantive statutory rights at issue trump arbitration and class waiver clauses in worker contracts. Perhaps the current promise of increased government enforcement of wage rights will come to pass. More ambitiously, unions and other worker activists could transform the arbitral forum by becoming legal advocates for low-wage workers to successfully prosecute individual wage claims in fair arbitration. Or, we might try a more innovative approach to grant meaningful judicial access through creating a forum designed to address modest wage claims.
While mapping the procedural and substantive interconnections contributing to the wage theft epidemic will not alone suffice, it serves to reveal the role of law in confounding the delivery of justice to low-wage workers. Whether the claims are common law or statutory, at the state or federal level, in litigation or arbitration, those who toil at the bottom of the economic ladder deserve legal remedies for chronic and systemic violations of their right to be paid the wages they have worked so hard to earn.
